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Abstract
Why are unemployment expectations of the man in the street markedly diﬀer-
ent from professional forecasts? We present an agent-based model to explain this
disconnection using boundedly rational agents with diﬀerent levels of education.
Keywords: Agent-based modeling; Bounded rationality; Unemployment ex-
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1 Introduction
Why are unemployment expectations widely heterogeneous among the men in the street
and strikingly diﬀerent from the ones produced by highly regarded institutions? The
question is extremely important, as economic decisions of households strongly depend on
their expectations.
2 Main purpose
Empirical surveys show that economic agents produce vastly diﬀerent sets of unemployment
forecasts that appear to be quite disconnected from professional expectations. Even if the
assumption of perfect rationality of agents is still present in the majority of scholarly work,
this is at odds with the observed data.
The present model assumes that households are boundedly rational in the sense that
their expectations are often based on wrong grounds, due to their limited ability or will-
ingness to detect (and digest!) relevant information. The framework is related to the
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epidemiological metaphor used in Carroll [1]: information is modeled like a virus, which
may infect the agents. Households can probabilistically absorb the information at time
t by a common source (say, mass media coverage) and react accordingly, or keep using
the obsolete information or even act on the basis of spurious facts. We will explore the
implications of diﬀerent degrees of (bounded) rationality on aggregate expectations.
3 Demonstration
Assume there are N agents, whose education level is edui ∈ E = {lths, hs, col}, with the
strings denoting Less than High School, High School and College, respectively. Agents
develop their expectations diﬀerently as a function of their education level.
At each time step agents can either get an informative signal ot, with some probability
λi = λ(edui) that depends on their education or remember the old signal si,t−1 if they get
no fresh news, or forget even the old signal. Formally the signal is given by:
sit =

ot with probability λi
si,t−1 with probability β(1− λi)
0 with probability (1− β)(1− λi)
, (1)
where ot is the latest professional forecast released by the media and β is the probability
to remember the past signal if one does not obtain a fresh forecast.
Once the (informative or uninformative) signal is available, agents convert it into an
answer ansit to the question How do you expect the number of people unemployed to
change over the next 12 months?. Similarly to the Michigan Survey or the European
Commission's Consumer Survey, answers are encoded with integers in {−2,−1, 0,+1,+2}
corresponding to qualitative answers {decrease sharply, decrease slightly, remain the same,
increase slightly, increase sharply}, respectively.
We assume that agents stubbornly report ansit = 2 with probability µi = µ(edui);
otherwise they translate their signal based on its perceived magnitude in the following
way:
ansit =
{
+2 with probability µi
f(sit|γ) with probability 1− µi . (2)
The translation function f depends on a threshold γ > 0 that shapes 5 ranges of values
driving the interpretation of the signal: the details are given in the companion paper Un-
employment expectations in an agent-based model with education but, in essence, if the
signal is large and positive, the agent will claim that unemployment will increase sharply;
if the signal is intermediate and positive, the milder conclusion is that unemployment is
about to increase slightly; ﬁnally, if the signal is small, no change is reported (and a similar
mechanism for negative signals will induce decrements of varying sizes).
At the end of period t, when all answers ansit, i = 1, ..., N, are available, it is straight-
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forward to compute an aggregate balance index:
xt =
100
N
N∑
i=1
ansit.
We start from the assumption that the more educated are more rational, in the sense
that they read newspapers more frequently and they have higher attention (i.e., higher
λ(edu)) and higher trust (i.e,. lower µ(edu)) towards the forecasts released by the mass
media. The values of the parameters are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated values of µ and λ
Parameter λ(lths) µ(lths) λ(hs) µ(hs) λ(col) µ(col)
Value 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1
We present ﬁve simulations. The baseline scenario is simulation (i), where β = 0.8,
γ = 0.4 and, of the N agents, one third is lths, one third hs and one third is col. Then, in
simulation (ii) two thirds of the population are lths and one third is hs, while in (iii) one
third is hs and two thirds are col. Then, in simulation (iv) β = 0.6 and in simulation (v)
β = 1.
We present a simulation with a total of 3000 agents for 200 periods. o0 is drawn from
an uniform U [−0.5, 0.5], then ot = 0.8ot−1 + t, where t ∼ N(0, 0.25).
Table 2: Calibration and Summary statistics
β % lths % hs % col Min 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max St.Dev ρ(xt, xt−1)
i 0.8 33.3 33.3 33.3 -46.00 -4.56 37.17 38.44 81.75 130.70 51.27 0.953
ii 0.8 66.7 33.3 0 -9.93 23.65 50.95 52.39 82.87 119.60 35.94 0.960
iii 0.8 0 33.3 66.7 -89.13 -31.14 23.33 24.49 80.39 143.90 66.85 0.947
iv 0.6 33.3 33.3 33.3 -27.13 7.37 39.08 38.79 69.76 104.60 38.87 0.927
v 1 33.3 33.3 33.3 -94.93 -26.96 39.82 38.15 94.27 193.20 77.83 0.975
Table 2 contrasts the distributions under the ﬁve simulations. Comparing the baseline
with simulation (ii) [(iii)], a decrease [increase] in the proportion of educated individuals
leads to an aggregate expectation which is more [less] pessimistic (higher [lower] mean),
less [more] dispersed (lower [higher] standard deviation) and slightly more [less] persistent
(higher [lower] one-lag autocorrelation ρ(xt, xt−1)).
Then, comparing the baseline with simulation (iv) [(v)], a decrease [increase] in the
probability of remembering the past information has no appreciable eﬀect on the mean, but
leads to a lower [higher] dispersion (lower [higher] standard deviation) and lower [higher]
persistence (lower [higher] autocorrelation).
Figure 1 plots the results of the ﬁve simulations: in the left panel simulations (i), (ii)
and (iii) are compared, (i), (iv) and (v) are contrasted in the right panel. Dotted lines
delimit the range of values attained by the diﬀerent simulations. Note also that these
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Figure 1: Households unemployment expectations balance
ranges are much narrower than the theoretical span of [-200,200] but, actually, much larger
than the ranges observed in the real data analyzed in the companion paper.
The practical session will also contain a demonstration of the use of NetLogo's ([2])
BehaviorSpace to calibrate the parameters to empirical data. We will show how to modify
the code to relax the assumption that information can only be obtained by a central source,
allowing for more peer-to-peer interaction. The time series obtained when agents can (copy
and) use the information of other households will be discussed and compared with the
previous results.
4 Conclusion
The present demonstration, based on (simulated) ﬁctitious series of inputs, has shown ways
to reproduce real time series by suitably calibrating the parameters of an agent-based model
populated with individuals who have diﬀerent education and may, to diﬀerent extents, fail
to update information or get it from other agents. The aggregate expectations depend
on the degree of (bounded) rationality of the agents and are aﬀected in particular by the
presence of an average, or permanent, level of pessimism that prompts agents to declare
that unemployment will increase sharply disregarding the professional forecasts (whatever
is their content).
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